Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation (Q6090447)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7767463

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English	Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation	scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7767463

Statements

scholarly article

Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation (English)

zbMATH Open document ID

10.1016/j.jet.2023.105712

Priyanka Shende

Journal of Economic Theory

publication date

17 November 2023

full work available at URL

https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.16384

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

zbMATH DE Number

zbMATH Keywords

random assignment

ordinal

strategy-proofness

envy-freeness

equal division

MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems

Strategy-proofness in the Large

Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems

Fair solutions to the random assignment problem

Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment

Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule

A new solution to the random assignment problem.

Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model

Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms

Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment

Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects

Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism

The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain

Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization

A characterization of the extended serial correspondence

The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values

Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies

Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?

Efficient lottery design

Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism

Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful

Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem

The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness

Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms

Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange

Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources

Pairwise kidney exchange

Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points

On cores and indivisibility

Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division

Queue allocation of indivisible goods

Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods

Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable

On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems

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Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:6090447

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