Pages that link to "Item:Q1079463"

The following pages link to Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control (Q1079463):

Displaying 50 items.

• Formal versus informal legislative bargaining (Q263365) (← links)
• Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives (Q284362) (← links)
• A note on extended stable sets (Q331706) (← links)
• Computing and visualizing Banks sets of dominance relations using relation algebra and RelView (Q383785) (← links)
• Computing minimal extending sets by relation-algebraic modeling and development (Q406434) (← links)
• A foundation for strategic agenda voting (Q485757) (← links)
• A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets (Q535405) (← links)
• Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction (Q536092) (← links)
• A social choice theory of legitimacy (Q537545) (← links)
• Maximum distance between Slater orders and Copeland orders of tournaments (Q633222) (← links)
• Minimal stable sets in tournaments (Q634517) (← links)
• Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members (Q647548) (← links)
• The minimal covering set in large tournaments (Q656810) (← links)
• Rank-based choice correspondences (Q673207) (← links)
• A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions (Q708800) (← links)
• On the tournament equilibrium set (Q750267) (← links)
• Simple games with many effective voters (Q844903) (← links)
• Endogenous voting agendas (Q857975) (← links)
• The Banks set in infinite spaces (Q857976) (← links)
• Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution (Q912750) (← links)
• Computing the minimal covering set (Q943589) (← links)
• A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set (Q964822) (← links)
• A tournament of order 14 with disjoint Banks and Slater sets (Q968179) (← links)
• An updated survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments (Q970187) (← links)
• The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas (Q995675) (← links)
• Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency (Q1017796) (← links)
• Choosing from a large tournament (Q1024772) (← links)
• A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions (Q1042317) (← links)
• On the complexity of Slater's problems (Q1043351) (← links)
• Choosing from a tournament (Q1089228) (← links)
• Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees (Q1091285) (← links)
• The uncovered set in spatial voting games (Q1098794) (← links)
• Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes (Q1104211) (← links)
• Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence (Q1107402) (← links)
• Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules (Q1113779) (← links)
• Majority tournaments: Sincere and sophisticated voting decisions under amendment procedure (Q1175774) (← links)
• On fuzzy tournaments and their solution concepts in group decision making (Q1179196) (← links)
• How hard is it to control an election? (Q1200886) (← links)
• Sequential voting by veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin algorithm more versatile (Q1207320) (← links)
• A theorem of voting rules and budget deficits (Q1331538) (← links)
• Weak covering relations (Q1342391) (← links)
• The Copeland measure of Condorcet choice functions (Q1343145) (← links)
• Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison (Q1377475) (← links)
• A 16-vertex tournament for which Banks set and Slater set are disjoint (Q1382278) (← links)
• Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958--2000) (Q1411039) (← links)
• Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy (Q1599833) (← links)
• On the difficulty of making social choices (Q1891667) (← links)
• On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures (Q1908005) (← links)
• Representation in majority tournaments (Q1964740) (← links)
• A topological characterization of the non-emptiness of the banks set and the uncovered set (Q1985662) (← links)