The following pages link to Continuity in auction design (Q1181229):
Displaying 21 items.
- Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design (Q523002) (← links)
- Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents (Q617679) (← links)
- Information acquisition and full surplus extraction (Q617680) (← links)
- Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types (Q665452) (← links)
- Optimal contracts with contingent allocation (Q777726) (← links)
- A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity (Q840688) (← links)
- Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible (Q996382) (← links)
- On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design (Q1017798) (← links)
- Pollution claim settlements under correlated information (Q1268595) (← links)
- Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes (Q1753695) (← links)
- The relevance of private information in mechanism design (Q1877157) (← links)
- Equity and adverse selection with correlated costs (Q1934074) (← links)
- Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions (Q2016235) (← links)
- Full surplus extraction from samples (Q2025025) (← links)
- Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction (Q2067386) (← links)
- Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure (Q2231375) (← links)
- Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage (Q2318123) (← links)
- Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly (Q2373375) (← links)
- Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents (Q2386136) (← links)
- Dynamic yardstick mechanisms (Q2491877) (← links)
- Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments (Q2496251) (← links)
