Pages that link to "Item:Q1322449"
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The following pages link to Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities (Q1322449):
Displayed 50 items.
- Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach (Q308656) (← links)
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods (Q402062) (← links)
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects (Q449183) (← links)
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets (Q498757) (← links)
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange (Q523519) (← links)
- Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods (Q557955) (← links)
- House allocation with fractional endowments (Q637577) (← links)
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Q639889) (← links)
- Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange (Q665102) (← links)
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation (Q697840) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems (Q700121) (← links)
- Unique stability in simple coalition formation games (Q705860) (← links)
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms (Q719868) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects (Q722621) (← links)
- Influence in private-goods allocation (Q776963) (← links)
- Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants (Q776969) (← links)
- Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples (Q776971) (← links)
- Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods (Q866940) (← links)
- Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods (Q869861) (← links)
- The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible (Q932763) (← links)
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization (Q980969) (← links)
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments (Q980972) (← links)
- Random assignment under weak preferences (Q1021614) (← links)
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness (Q1028549) (← links)
- Implementation in generalized matching problems (Q1363086) (← links)
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods. (Q1415914) (← links)
- Consistency in house allocation problems (Q1576474) (← links)
- Matching with single-peaked preferences (Q1729666) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited (Q1757579) (← links)
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (Q1762420) (← links)
- An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism (Q1785480) (← links)
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation (Q1792571) (← links)
- House allocation with existing tenants (Q1809490) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems (Q1867775) (← links)
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation (Q1973452) (← links)
- Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences (Q1995476) (← links)
- Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets (Q2025051) (← links)
- A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties (Q2075459) (← links)
- Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects (Q2078057) (← links)
- Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler (Q2100102) (← links)
- Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market (Q2100651) (← links)
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities (Q2138371) (← links)
- Trading probabilities along cycles (Q2138374) (← links)
- On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets (Q2138378) (← links)
- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked (Q2155231) (← links)
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (Q2173093) (← links)
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model (Q2205990) (← links)
- Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching (Q2206800) (← links)
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses (Q2222205) (← links)
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values (Q2222222) (← links)