Pages that link to "Item:Q1350573"
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The following pages link to A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems (Q1350573):
Displayed 16 items.
- Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem (Q306741) (← links)
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker (Q417692) (← links)
- The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation (Q532676) (← links)
- Matching markets under (in)complete information (Q894021) (← links)
- Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money (Q896943) (← links)
- Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems (Q930486) (← links)
- Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities (Q999743) (← links)
- The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets (Q1285523) (← links)
- Games of manipulation in marriage problems (Q1369072) (← links)
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets (Q1381985) (← links)
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems. (Q1427493) (← links)
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals (Q1800965) (← links)
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431839) (← links)
- Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms (Q2569387) (← links)
- When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results (Q3394931) (← links)
- Dynamically stable matching (Q6059528) (← links)