Pages that link to "Item:Q1357430"
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The following pages link to Implementation of college admission rules (Q1357430):
Displayed 28 items.
- An analysis of the German university admissions system (Q361830) (← links)
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation (Q405557) (← links)
- Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules (Q417718) (← links)
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching (Q523005) (← links)
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market (Q532688) (← links)
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples (Q708931) (← links)
- Nash implementation without no-veto power (Q952763) (← links)
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP) (Q972135) (← links)
- An impossibility theorem for matching problems (Q989977) (← links)
- Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability (Q1021616) (← links)
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (Q1031836) (← links)
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations (Q1276120) (← links)
- The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets (Q1285523) (← links)
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets (Q1381985) (← links)
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. (Q1420524) (← links)
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems (Q1577962) (← links)
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem (Q1927736) (← links)
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities (Q2013344) (← links)
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities (Q2078086) (← links)
- Weak implementation (Q2308791) (← links)
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems (Q2343805) (← links)
- On combining implementable social choice rules (Q2384429) (← links)
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431839) (← links)
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria (Q2453419) (← links)
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems (Q2496782) (← links)
- Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities (Q2668990) (← links)
- Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (Q6107369) (← links)