Pages that link to "Item:Q1584552"

The following pages link to Participation constraints in adverse selection models (Q1584552):

Displaying 50 items.

• Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information (Q323245) (← links)
• Asymmetric information in a bilateral monopoly (Q330436) (← links)
• Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint (Q343116) (← links)
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities (Q368060) (← links)
• Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information (Q405002) (← links)
• Partial ownership and cross-border mergers (Q405013) (← links)
• Bargaining over incentive contracts (Q414377) (← links)
• On the optimality of exclusion in multi-dimensional screening (Q462859) (← links)
• Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules (Q523014) (← links)
• Optimal taxation in the extensive model (Q533085) (← links)
• Supplier credits, limited liquidity, and timely demand information (Q538480) (← links)
• Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO (Q617590) (← links)
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information (Q645061) (← links)
• Pre-sale information (Q654512) (← links)
• Ironing without control (Q654524) (← links)
• Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets (Q666293) (← links)
• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case (Q852326) (← links)
• Implementation of competitive nonlinear pricing: tariffs with inclusive consumption (Q862750) (← links)
• An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values (Q894059) (← links)
• Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation (Q894072) (← links)
• Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions (Q896942) (← links)
• Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines (Q899681) (← links)
• Dynamic screening with limited commitment (Q900605) (← links)
• Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition (Q972876) (← links)
• An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance (Q975922) (← links)
• Mechanism design with collusive supervision (Q1001815) (← links)
• The role of optimal threats in auction design (Q1007337) (← links)
• A general principal-agent setting with non-differentiable mechanisms: Some examples (Q1013522) (← links)
• Optimal regulation with unknown demand and cost functions (Q1289259) (← links)
• Coordination and externalities (Q1381964) (← links)
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models (Q1584552) (← links)
• Identification of participation constraints in contracts (Q1626993) (← links)
• Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present (Q1640935) (← links)
• Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result (Q1682735) (← links)
• Trading under market impact: crossing networks interacting with dealer markets (Q1734539) (← links)
• Designing multi-period supply contracts in a two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric information (Q1737492) (← links)
• Managerial compensation and research and development investment in a two-period agency setting (Q1800314) (← links)
• On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information (Q1851234) (← links)
• Contractual distortions in a market with frictions (Q1877170) (← links)
• A model of product line design and introduction sequence with reservation utility (Q1926743) (← links)
• Optimal pricing for selling a congestible good with countervailing incentives (Q1927493) (← links)
• Informed principal and countervailing incentives (Q1929838) (← links)
• Pricing decision of a manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain with asymmetric information (Q1999624) (← links)
• Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values (Q2013372) (← links)
• Optimal sales mechanism with outside options (Q2044989) (← links)
• Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation (Q2056858) (← links)
• A model of secular migration from centralized to decentralized trade (Q2059059) (← links)
• An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies (Q2150436) (← links)
• Self-rejecting mechanisms (Q2178032) (← links)
• Existence of solutions to principal-agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions (Q2178586) (← links)