Pages that link to "Item:Q1680740"
From MaRDI portal
The following pages link to Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation (Q1680740):
Displaying 6 items.
- Social acceptability of Condorcet committees (Q777455) (← links)
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (Q2236184) (← links)
- Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention (Q5053686) (← links)
- Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems (Q5053696) (← links)
- From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture (Q5053700) (← links)
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report (Q5053701) (← links)
