Pages that link to "Item:Q1762420"

The following pages link to On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (Q1762420):

Displaying 19 items.

• Enrollment manipulations in school choice (Q268634) (← links)
• An analysis of the German university admissions system (Q361830) (← links)
• An alternative characterization of top trading cycles (Q372362) (← links)
• Application fee manipulations in matching markets (Q393269) (← links)
• Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems (Q403704) (← links)
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles (Q496872) (← links)
• Sticky matching in school choice (Q683828) (← links)
• Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities (Q1691346) (← links)
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation (Q1792571) (← links)
• Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets (Q2021788) (← links)
• An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches (Q2049465) (← links)
• The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets (Q2376989) (← links)
• When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? (Q2402812) (← links)
• Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study (Q2416636) (← links)
• Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules (Q2416641) (← links)
• Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (Q2437801) (← links)
• The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
• Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria (Q2453419) (← links)
• Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism (Q6156336) (← links)