Pages that link to "Item:Q1890915"
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The following pages link to An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives (Q1890915):
Displayed 11 items.
- Coordination after gains and losses: is prospect theory's value function predictive for games? (Q708640) (← links)
- Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry (Q926188) (← links)
- Playing safe in coordination games: The roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play (Q1395587) (← links)
- Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination (Q1753291) (← links)
- Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information (Q1753305) (← links)
- On the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten (Q1893188) (← links)
- Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games (Q2496235) (← links)
- The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games (Q2667261) (← links)
- A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION (Q3153675) (← links)
- A COMPLEMENTARY NOTE ON THE ISSUE OF TIME INCONSISTENCY REVISITED AS AN EXTENDED GAME (Q3166250) (← links)
- Some qualitative differences between the replicator dynamics of two player and n player games (Q4377206) (← links)