Pages that link to "Item:Q2431839"

The following pages link to Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431839):

Displaying 20 items.

• Enrollment manipulations in school choice (Q268634) (← links)
• Application fee manipulations in matching markets (Q393269) (← links)
• Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems (Q403704) (← links)
• Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching (Q485428) (← links)
• Optimal truncation in matching markets (Q485816) (← links)
• The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences (Q500490) (← links)
• A further note on the college admission game (Q662278) (← links)
• Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket (Q836923) (← links)
• Manipulation via capacities revisited (Q980957) (← links)
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (Q1762420) (← links)
• Incentives in landing slot problems (Q2359379) (← links)
• The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets (Q2376989) (← links)
• When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? (Q2402812) (← links)
• Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods (Q2406941) (← links)
• Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431838) (← links)
• Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets (Q2437176) (← links)
• The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
• Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria (Q2453419) (← links)
• Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited (Q2628708) (← links)
• When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results (Q3394931) (← links)