Pages that link to "Item:Q3346115"

The following pages link to Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection (Q3346115):

Displaying 50 items.

• Hard and soft preparation sets in Boolean games (Q310097) (← links)
• The computational complexity of iterated elimination of dominated strategies (Q315527) (← links)
• Rational beliefs in rationalizability (Q333439) (← links)
• Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces (Q361813) (← links)
• Welfare-maximizing correlated equilibria using Kantorovich polynomials with sparsity (Q367164) (← links)
• Regret matching with finite memory (Q367483) (← links)
• An example of a dominance approach to rational expectations (Q374989) (← links)
• Scalarization methods and expected multi-utility representations (Q402061) (← links)
• Strategic stability in Poisson games (Q406374) (← links)
• Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games (Q417690) (← links)
• Forward induction equilibrium (Q417699) (← links)
• Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players (Q423741) (← links)
• Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games (Q423893) (← links)
• An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences (Q453207) (← links)
• Pairwise epistemic conditions for correlated rationalizability (Q459409) (← links)
• Utility proportional beliefs (Q480852) (← links)
• Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction (Q491310) (← links)
• Full implementation in backward induction (Q492868) (← links)
• Identification of complete information games (Q496152) (← links)
• Corrigendum to ``Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior'' (Q503063) (← links)
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information (Q508409) (← links)
• A minimal logic for interactive epistemology (Q516245) (← links)
• Correlated-belief equilibrium (Q516246) (← links)
• On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information (Q532667) (← links)
• Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts. Concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substituabilities (Q540419) (← links)
• Iterative information update and stability of strategies (Q542135) (← links)
• Rationalizable implementation (Q548264) (← links)
• On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations (Q550192) (← links)
• An algorithm for proper rationalizability (Q550196) (← links)
• Equilibrium without independence (Q582216) (← links)
• Rationalizability in continuous games (Q617599) (← links)
• Kernel-based type spaces (Q617695) (← links)
• Strategic games beyond expected utility (Q641826) (← links)
• On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games (Q647483) (← links)
• The computational complexity of weak saddles (Q647484) (← links)
• Common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information (Q654534) (← links)
• Possibility and permissibility (Q656787) (← links)
• Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players (Q662271) (← links)
• Dynamic coordination with individual learning (Q665081) (← links)
• Iterated regret minimization: a new solution concept (Q665088) (← links)
• Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility (Q674075) (← links)
• Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction (Q697965) (← links)
• On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response (Q705862) (← links)
• Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions (Q725051) (← links)
• Epistemically robust strategy subsets (Q725063) (← links)
• Bounds for best response functions in binary games (Q738103) (← links)
• Rational behavior and rational expectations (Q753623) (← links)
• Two-person pairwise solvable games (Q776846) (← links)
• Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory (Q815217) (← links)
• Computation of equilibria in noncooperative games (Q815274) (← links)