Pages that link to "Item:Q3352883"

The following pages link to The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values (Q3352883):

Displaying 44 items.

• A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types (Q281360) (← links)
• Informed seller with taste heterogeneity (Q308640) (← links)
• Lender deception as a response to moral hazard (Q404990) (← links)
• Sorting the good guys from bad: on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition (Q471323) (← links)
• Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements (Q485745) (← links)
• The strategically ignorant principal (Q523523) (← links)
• Interim third-party selection in bargaining (Q523532) (← links)
• Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects (Q632972) (← links)
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure (Q633787) (← links)
• Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism (Q645642) (← links)
• Overconfidence and moral hazard (Q645649) (← links)
• Starting small and commitment (Q700110) (← links)
• Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals (Q894045) (← links)
• An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values (Q894059) (← links)
• Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability (Q900426) (← links)
• An efficient solution to the informed principal problem (Q938057) (← links)
• Informed principal and information gathering agent (Q1029530) (← links)
• Starting small and renegotiation (Q1289252) (← links)
• A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information (Q1306770) (← links)
• Debt as a collusive device in an oligopoly supergame (Q1378874) (← links)
• Informed principal model and contract in supply chain with demand disruption asymmetric information (Q1792818) (← links)
• Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities. (Q1810427) (← links)
• Two-person bargaining with verifiable information (Q1886755) (← links)
• Optimal trading mechanisms for an informed seller (Q1927367) (← links)
• Informed principal and countervailing incentives (Q1929838) (← links)
• Information transmission and inefficient lobbying (Q2016239) (← links)
• Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request (Q2049458) (← links)
• Two-sided strategic information transmission (Q2155900) (← links)
• On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets (Q2212743) (← links)
• Experimental design to persuade (Q2343397) (← links)
• Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners (Q2347780) (← links)
• Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values (Q2359391) (← links)
• Supply chain coordination by risk sharing contracts under random production yield and deterministic demand (Q2454379) (← links)
• Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs (Q2457243) (← links)
• Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints (Q2469872) (← links)
• Bribing in second-price auctions (Q2516238) (← links)
• Informed principal with correlation (Q2519479) (← links)
• Informed principal problems in bilateral trading (Q2675402) (← links)
• Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat (Q2685614) (← links)
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values (Q4586109) (← links)
• Selling with evidence (Q5225078) (← links)
• Technical Note—Nonlinear Pricing Competition with Private Capacity Information (Q5740213) (← links)
• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals (Q6063099) (← links)
• Bargaining power in crisis bargaining (Q6064222) (← links)