Pages that link to "Item:Q337801"

The following pages link to Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801):

Displaying 20 items.

• Enrollment manipulations in school choice (Q268634) (← links)
• Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences (Q477355) (← links)
• Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints (Q508390) (← links)
• Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities (Q1691346) (← links)
• Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations (Q1996172) (← links)
• Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand (Q2036905) (← links)
• How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field (Q2049478) (← links)
• On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms (Q2060531) (← links)
• When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action? (Q2125094) (← links)
• The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home? (Q2152118) (← links)
• On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice (Q2157898) (← links)
• On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action (Q2292744) (← links)
• Improving schools through school choice: an experimental study of deferred acceptance (Q2292817) (← links)
• Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case (Q2294296) (← links)
• Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems (Q2424243) (← links)
• Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (Q2437801) (← links)
• Market Design (Q5150291) (← links)
• Stable Matching in Large Economies (Q5225243) (← links)
• Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice (Q6168800) (← links)
• Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems (Q6188681) (← links)