The following pages link to Matt Van Essen (Q337802):
Displayed 12 items.
- Dissolving a partnership dynamically (Q337803) (← links)
- Item:Q337802 (redirect page) (← links)
- A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation (Q404766) (← links)
- Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms (Q427552) (← links)
- A note on the stability of Chen's Lindahl mechanism (Q431813) (← links)
- Dissolving a partnership securely (Q2175968) (← links)
- Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value (Q2231393) (← links)
- Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model (Q2334845) (← links)
- Blind stealing: experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment (Q2347776) (← links)
- An equilibrium analysis of Knaster's fair division procedure (Q2351206) (← links)
- A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller (Q2511261) (← links)
- Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers (Q6063100) (← links)