The following pages link to Axioms for Deferred Acceptance (Q3564693):
Displaying 50 items.
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics (Q290170) (← links)
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles (Q372362) (← links)
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems (Q403704) (← links)
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds (Q406428) (← links)
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare (Q423772) (← links)
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods (Q431227) (← links)
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea (Q472219) (← links)
- On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable (Q656783) (← links)
- New axioms for immediate acceptance (Q682464) (← links)
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process (Q682475) (← links)
- A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods (Q682480) (← links)
- Decentralized college admissions under single application (Q826044) (← links)
- Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets (Q826612) (← links)
- Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms (Q969481) (← links)
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application (Q1633670) (← links)
- Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems (Q1671327) (← links)
- On lexicographic choice (Q1788027) (← links)
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q1939517) (← links)
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process (Q2013375) (← links)
- Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets (Q2025051) (← links)
- Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems (Q2044987) (← links)
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects (Q2058845) (← links)
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab (Q2067353) (← links)
- Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form (Q2070570) (← links)
- A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources (Q2108757) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade (Q2108764) (← links)
- Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts (Q2128949) (← links)
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (Q2173093) (← links)
- Essentially stable matchings (Q2178028) (← links)
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices (Q2206002) (← links)
- Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching (Q2206800) (← links)
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants (Q2334138) (← links)
- The modified Boston mechanism (Q2334829) (← links)
- Incentives in landing slot problems (Q2359379) (← links)
- Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems (Q2375893) (← links)
- New axioms for deferred acceptance (Q2397664) (← links)
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? (Q2402812) (← links)
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems (Q2424243) (← links)
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (Q2437801) (← links)
- The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
- Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types (Q2513285) (← links)
- Making just school assignments (Q2516227) (← links)
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism (Q2637851) (← links)
- Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets (Q2660053) (← links)
- School choice with preference rank classes (Q2681516) (← links)
- On Capacity-Filling and Substitutable Choice Rules (Q4958546) (← links)
- Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities (Q5247606) (← links)
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible (Q5964686) (← links)
- Stable and extremely unequal (Q6047334) (← links)
- A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism (Q6168823) (← links)
