The following pages link to Efficient Auctions (Q4495443):
Displayed 50 items.
- Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations (Q290174) (← links)
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching (Q308609) (← links)
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective (Q320681) (← links)
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies (Q324173) (← links)
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities (Q368060) (← links)
- Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty (Q405546) (← links)
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations (Q405757) (← links)
- Optimal search, learning and implementation (Q417605) (← links)
- Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability (Q508408) (← links)
- Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization (Q518710) (← links)
- On efficiency of the English auction (Q634510) (← links)
- The robustness of robust implementation (Q643278) (← links)
- Second best efficiency and the English auction (Q645656) (← links)
- Locally robust implementation and its limits (Q694745) (← links)
- Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs (Q705856) (← links)
- An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations (Q705945) (← links)
- Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information (Q785531) (← links)
- Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights (Q836879) (← links)
- Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types (Q839608) (← links)
- On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions (Q892845) (← links)
- Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule (Q926222) (← links)
- Ex post implementation (Q932807) (← links)
- Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials (Q957859) (← links)
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results (Q1001138) (← links)
- English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Q1007332) (← links)
- A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types (Q1014325) (← links)
- Multiagent system simulations of signal averaging in English auctions with two-dimensional value signals (Q1038767) (← links)
- Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations. (Q1408641) (← links)
- Asymmetric English auctions. (Q1414615) (← links)
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade. (Q1421886) (← links)
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions. (Q1429922) (← links)
- English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders (Q1748368) (← links)
- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents (Q1757591) (← links)
- Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions (Q1885425) (← links)
- Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions (Q1885427) (← links)
- Information revelation and efficiency in auctions (Q1927500) (← links)
- Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab (Q1927541) (← links)
- VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities (Q1929830) (← links)
- Bad news can be good news: early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals (Q1934086) (← links)
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models (Q2078029) (← links)
- Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments (Q2164330) (← links)
- Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions (Q2173111) (← links)
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values (Q2222222) (← links)
- Merger negotiations and ex-post regret (Q2271375) (← links)
- Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment (Q2273945) (← links)
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces (Q2324797) (← links)
- Evidence reading mechanisms (Q2325665) (← links)
- An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals (Q2334127) (← links)
- Index-wise comparative statics (Q2334848) (← links)
- Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values (Q2357821) (← links)