Pages that link to "Item:Q4682776"

The following pages link to Improving matching under hard distributional constraints (Q4682776):

Displaying 23 items.

• Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints (Q508390) (← links)
• Handling preferences in student-project allocation (Q1730741) (← links)
• The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment (Q1753287) (← links)
• Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas (Q1757561) (← links)
• Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis (Q1757595) (← links)
• Graduate admission with financial support (Q1985735) (← links)
• School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution (Q1996170) (← links)
• Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers (Q2049501) (← links)
• When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action? (Q2125094) (← links)
• Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment (Q2138086) (← links)
• Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism (Q2159837) (← links)
• Matching through institutions (Q2173398) (← links)
• Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy (Q2309466) (← links)
• Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints (Q2680800) (← links)
• Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints (Q5129207) (← links)
• Assignment Mechanisms Under Distributional Constraints (Q5131470) (← links)
• Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching (Q6120933) (← links)
• Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves (Q6146437) (← links)
• Fisher markets with linear constraints: equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms (Q6176737) (← links)
• A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain (Q6176744) (← links)
• Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems (Q6188681) (← links)
• Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system (Q6575508) (← links)
• Capacity design in school choice (Q6584598) (← links)