Pages that link to "Item:Q485776"

The following pages link to On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (Q485776):

Displaying 9 items.

• A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea (Q472219) (← links)
• Epsilon-stability in school choice (Q1697834) (← links)
• Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q2041080) (← links)
• School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms (Q2051001) (← links)
• Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice (Q2061119) (← links)
• Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications (Q2323297) (← links)
• Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings (Q5095181) (← links)
• Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) (Q5149725) (← links)
• When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (Q6063102) (← links)