Pages that link to "Item:Q4942169"

The following pages link to The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory (Q4942169):

Displaying 50 items.

• You've come a long way, Bayesians (Q266667) (← links)
• Keynes's coefficient of dependence revisited (Q320161) (← links)
• A new problem with mixed decisions, or: you'll regret reading this article, but you still should (Q334855) (← links)
• Reversing 30~years of discussion: why causal decision theorists should one-box (Q383017) (← links)
• Regret and instability in causal decision theory (Q383019) (← links)
• Collective acts (Q383026) (← links)
• Is the conjunction fallacy tied to probabilistic confirmation? (Q408352) (← links)
• Assessing theories: the coherentist approach (Q488361) (← links)
• Lost memories and useless coins: revisiting the absentminded driver (Q514617) (← links)
• Conditioning, intervening, and decision (Q516305) (← links)
• New theory about old evidence. A framework for open-minded Bayesianism (Q516311) (← links)
• Clark Glymour's responses to the contributions to the Synthese special issue ``Causation, probability, and truth: the philosophy of Clark Glymour'' (Q516312) (← links)
• Understanding Deutsch's probability in a deterministic multiverse (Q640078) (← links)
• Quantum probability and many worlds (Q643117) (← links)
• The algorithmization of counterfactuals (Q657586) (← links)
• Reconciling Savage's and Luce's modeling of uncertainty: the best of both worlds (Q730145) (← links)
• Bayesian confirmation theory and the likelihood principle (Q885530) (← links)
• Subjective probabilities need not be sharp (Q907890) (← links)
• Humean supervenience and multidimensional semantics (Q907894) (← links)
• Assessing theories, Bayes style (Q928733) (← links)
• Subjunctive conditional probability (Q1702977) (← links)
• Confirmation, increase in probability, and partial discrimination: a reply to Zalabardo (Q1705300) (← links)
• Probabilism, representation theorems, and whether deliberation crowds out prediction (Q1706798) (← links)
• Do bets reveal beliefs? A unified perspective on state-dependent utility issues (Q1708872) (← links)
• Interventionist decision theory (Q1708901) (← links)
• Newcomb meets Gettier (Q1708953) (← links)
• From outcomes to acts: a non-standard axiomatization of the expected utility principle (Q1771202) (← links)
• Learning and pooling, pooling and learning (Q1797899) (← links)
• Triviality pursuit (Q1929168) (← links)
• God \(-\) Moore = Ramsey (a reply to Chalmers and Hájek) (Q1929170) (← links)
• Conditionals and supposition-based reasoning (Q1929172) (← links)
• Is there a place in Bayesian confirmation theory for the reverse Matthew effect? (Q1989962) (← links)
• The faulty signal problem: counterfactual asymmetries in causal decision theory and rational deliberation (Q1989984) (← links)
• Counterfactual skepticism and multidimensional semantics (Q1990930) (← links)
• Confirmation and the ordinal equivalence thesis (Q2052156) (← links)
• Team reasoning and the rational choice of payoff-dominant outcomes in games (Q2098311) (← links)
• A simpler and more realistic subjective decision theory (Q2218702) (← links)
• Probabilistic measures of coherence: from adequacy constraints towards pluralism (Q2263055) (← links)
• Causal decision theory and EPR correlations (Q2263063) (← links)
• What are the minimal requirements of rational choice? Arguments from the sequential-decision setting (Q2380524) (← links)
• Conditionals in causal decision theory (Q2442128) (← links)
• The logic of theory assessment (Q2454872) (← links)
• Logic with numbers (Q2460150) (← links)
• The kinematics of belief and desire (Q2460151) (← links)
• Are Newcomb problems really decisions? (Q2460152) (← links)
• Distinguishing indeterminate belief from ``risk-averse'' preferences (Q2460185) (← links)
• A unified Bayesian decision theory (Q2461757) (← links)
• Collective, universal, and joint rationality (Q2464046) (← links)
• Knowing and supposing in games of perfect information (Q2464645) (← links)
• The logic of dominance reasoning (Q2499289) (← links)