The following pages link to Algorithmic mechanism design (Q5938624):
Displaying 50 items.
- On resilient graph spanners (Q289925) (← links)
- Synthesis with rational environments (Q314471) (← links)
- Nonpreemptive coordination mechanisms for identical machines (Q372964) (← links)
- Maximizing the minimum load: the cost of selfishness (Q390908) (← links)
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification (Q391782) (← links)
- Reducing price of anarchy of selfish task allocation with more selfishness (Q393039) (← links)
- The price of anarchy on uniformly related machines revisited (Q418148) (← links)
- On bilevel machine scheduling problems (Q421065) (← links)
- An incentive-based distributed mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in tree networks (Q433420) (← links)
- Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects (Q477597) (← links)
- Combinatorial auctions without money (Q521808) (← links)
- Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding (Q526848) (← links)
- Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games (Q604756) (← links)
- Modelling and analysis of a network organization for cooperation of manufacturers on production capacity (Q610074) (← links)
- Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness (Q627119) (← links)
- Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines (Q635328) (← links)
- Truthful mechanisms for selfish routing and two-parameter agents (Q647482) (← links)
- Incentive-compatible interdomain routing (Q658663) (← links)
- A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing (Q692628) (← links)
- Automated optimal OSP mechanisms for set systems. The case of small domains (Q777956) (← links)
- The Pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design (Q777959) (← links)
- Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions (Q812381) (← links)
- Auction design with costly preference elicitation (Q812389) (← links)
- Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity (Q834857) (← links)
- Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism (Q834861) (← links)
- Coordination mechanisms (Q838145) (← links)
- The price of envy-freeness in machine scheduling (Q899310) (← links)
- Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values (Q904689) (← links)
- Copula-based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines (Q904694) (← links)
- Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles (Q932809) (← links)
- Group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms for makespan and other scheduling problems (Q935148) (← links)
- Mechanism design for a multicommodity flow game in service network alliances (Q957334) (← links)
- Non-cooperative cost sharing games via subsidies (Q987398) (← links)
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results (Q1001137) (← links)
- Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification (Q1006066) (← links)
- Dynamic mechanism design (Q1014626) (← links)
- Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines (Q1026241) (← links)
- A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms (Q1031874) (← links)
- On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks (Q1041343) (← links)
- Hardness results for multicast cost sharing. (Q1401398) (← links)
- A parallel machine schedule updating game with compensations and clients averse to uncertain loss (Q1634066) (← links)
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (Q1651232) (← links)
- Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality (Q1751281) (← links)
- No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems (Q1792559) (← links)
- Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing (Q1885423) (← links)
- Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions (Q1885427) (← links)
- Continuous learning methods in two-buyer pricing problem (Q1935931) (← links)
- A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms (Q1949759) (← links)
- A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing (Q1953638) (← links)
- Incentive compatible regression learning (Q1959425) (← links)
