The following pages link to Domenico Menicucci (Q709084):
Displayed 21 items.
- A note on information revelation in procurement auctions (Q709085) (← links)
- On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist (Q745001) (← links)
- Harmful competition in all-pay auctions (Q1042337) (← links)
- Optimal two-object auctions with synergies (Q1414884) (← links)
- Efficient mechanisms for a partially public good. (Q1862737) (← links)
- Deriving the respiratory sinus arrhythmia from the heartbeat time series using empirical mode decomposition (Q1878024) (← links)
- Selling to the highest valuation bidder under risk aversion and asymmetry (Q1927306) (← links)
- Risk aversion in first price auctions with common values (Q1927583) (← links)
- On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders (Q1929102) (← links)
- In the basic auction model, the optimal reserve price may depend on the number of bidders (Q2067373) (← links)
- Sequential auctions with decreasing reserve prices (Q2098980) (← links)
- A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders (Q2098997) (← links)
- On the optimal entry fee and reserve price for auctions with selective entry: a comment on Gentry, Li, Lu (2017) (Q2178004) (← links)
- A minimal model for the tespiratory sinus arrhythmia (Q2373116) (← links)
- On the unprofitability of buyer groups when sellers compete (Q2416647) (← links)
- Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments (Q2496251) (← links)
- Banning bidders from all-pay auctions (Q2505517) (← links)
- Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations (Q2867516) (← links)
- Competition May Reduce the Revenue in a First Price Auction with Affiliated Private Values (Q3573089) (← links)
- Evolutionary Selection of Socially Sensitive Preferences in Random Matching Environments (Q3650939) (← links)
- Rawlsian altruism with perfect discrimination leads to social efficiency (Q4963359) (← links)