Epsilon-stability in school choice (Q1697834): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 05:18, 15 July 2024

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Epsilon-stability in school choice
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    Epsilon-stability in school choice (English)
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    20 February 2018
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    epsilon-stability
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    school choice
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    ordinal preference
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    cardinal score
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