On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly (Q1779013): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 21:48, 19 March 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly |
scientific article |
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On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly (English)
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20 June 2005
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Plurality rule
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regular equilibria
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stable sets.
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