A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities (Q1192631): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90024-9
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+W1982876675
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: I
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+The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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+Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
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+Reputation and imperfect information
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+Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
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+Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
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+The chain store paradox
@@ Property / cites work: The chain store paradox / rank @@
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