Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management (Q1804612): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 14:27, 23 May 2024

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Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management
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    Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management (English)
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    10 October 1995
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    capital investment
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    private information
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    optimal employment contract
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