Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences (Q1814942): Difference between revisions

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+Q3266133
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+Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
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+On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
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+The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
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+Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
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+Voting cycles and the structure of individual preferences
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+Geometry of voting
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+Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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+Publication:1814942