Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues (Q1368881): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 18:13, 27 May 2024

scientific article
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English
Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
scientific article

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    Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues (English)
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    1 October 1997
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    two-sided matching
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    stability
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