Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues (Q1368881): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Set profile property. |
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs) Changed an Item |
||
| (One intermediate revision by one other user not shown) | |||
| Property / OpenAlex ID | |||
| Property / OpenAlex ID: W2000982483 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Q3066116 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Latest revision as of 18:13, 27 May 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues |
scientific article |
Statements
Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues (English)
0 references
1 October 1997
0 references
two-sided matching
0 references
stability
0 references
