The theory of implementation when the planner is a player (Q1381976): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 11:57, 28 May 2024

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The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
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    The theory of implementation when the planner is a player (English)
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    1 April 1998
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    signaling game
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    Nash implementation
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