An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable (Q1268651): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Importer (talk | contribs)
Created a new Item
 
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(3 intermediate revisions by 3 users not shown)
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0614 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2072148344 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3197645 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5688334 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Endogenous Formation of Coalitions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Graphs and Cooperation in Games / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Coalition formation under limited communication / rank
 
Normal rank
links / mardi / namelinks / mardi / name
 

Latest revision as of 16:55, 28 May 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable
scientific article

    Statements

    An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    18 October 1998
    0 references
    0 references
    noncooperative linking game
    0 references
    cooperation structures
    0 references
    0 references