An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable (Q1268651): Difference between revisions

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+Q3197645
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+Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
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+Q5688334
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+Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
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+Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation
@@ Property / cites work: Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation / rank @@
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+Graphs and Cooperation in Games
@@ Property / cites work: Graphs and Cooperation in Games / rank @@
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+Coalition formation under limited communication
@@ Property / cites work: Coalition formation under limited communication / rank @@
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