Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard (Q1276114): Difference between revisions

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+Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents
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+An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
@@ Property / cites work: An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem / rank @@
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+Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
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+Q3354678
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+Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
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+Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
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+Q3903596
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+Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
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+Efficiency in partnerships
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+Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-time model
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+Q4108109
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+The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
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+The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
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+Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping
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+Normal rank