Asymptotic efficiency in dynamic principal-agent problems (Q1572946): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2623
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2000141013
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2000141013 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3969647
@@ Property / cites work: Q3969647 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3354678
@@ Property / cites work: Q3354678 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4108109
@@ Property / cites work: Q4108109 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
+Normal rank