Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999) (Q1592722): Difference between revisions

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+Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
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+Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
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+After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
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+Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
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+Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
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+Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
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+Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
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+Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
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+Publication:1592722