ON THE SEMIVALUES AND THE POWER CORE OF COOPERATIVE TU GAMES (Q2772847): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 21:56, 3 June 2024

scientific article
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ON THE SEMIVALUES AND THE POWER CORE OF COOPERATIVE TU GAMES
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    ON THE SEMIVALUES AND THE POWER CORE OF COOPERATIVE TU GAMES (English)
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    11 April 2002
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    power core
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    Shapley value
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    TU games
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