On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data (Q1867823): Difference between revisions

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On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data
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    On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data (English)
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    2 April 2003
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    Condorcet criterion
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    Majority rule
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    Semiorders
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    Survey data
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    Weak orders
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    Voting
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