Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs (Q705856): Difference between revisions

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+Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
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+Efficient Auctions
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+Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
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+Q3208356
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+Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
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+Incentives in Teams
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+On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
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+Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
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+Mechanism design in queueing problems
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+Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
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+Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
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+An Efficient Auction
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+On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
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+Q5184913
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+On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
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