When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts (Q1774815): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / author @@
-Stephan E. Spear
@@ Property / author: Stephan E. Spear / rank @@
-Normal rank
@@ Property / author @@
+Stephan E. Spear
@@ Property / author: Stephan E. Spear / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.008
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2039626832
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2039626832 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
@@ Property / cites work: Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
@@ Property / cites work: On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
+Normal rank