When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts (Q1774815): Difference between revisions
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| Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank | |||
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| Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.008 / rank | |||
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| Property / OpenAlex ID: W2039626832 / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 10:58, 10 June 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts |
scientific article |
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When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts (English)
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4 May 2005
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