Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection (Q5316206): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-26979-7_23 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 16:18, 10 June 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2204538
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English
Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2204538

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    Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection (English)
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    12 September 2005
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    Rationing
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    Types
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    Equilibrium
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    Refinement
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    Strategic stability
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    Walrasian
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