Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria are competitive in a repeated economy (Q1171495): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 17:24, 13 June 2024

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Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria are competitive in a repeated economy
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    Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria are competitive in a repeated economy (English)
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    1982
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    finite exchange economy
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    repeated economy
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    family of strategic games
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    Pareto optimal allocations
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    Nash equilibria
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