Imperfect information, monitoring cost and incentives in the agency problem (Q4740298): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 17:59, 13 June 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3795641
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English
Imperfect information, monitoring cost and incentives in the agency problem
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3795641

    Statements

    Imperfect information, monitoring cost and incentives in the agency problem (English)
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    1982
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    optimal information gathering
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    costly information
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    agency problem, imperfect monitoring
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    moral hazard
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    principal
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    imperfect information
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