Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes (Q1050243): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 08:13, 14 June 2024

scientific article
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English
Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
scientific article

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    Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes (English)
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    1983
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    risk averse buyers
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    unobservable tastes
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    expected profit
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    selling indivisible units
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    first-price auction
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    incentive compatibility
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