A note on reactive equilibria in the discounted prisoner's dilemma and associated games (Q1112746): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
RedirectionBot (talk | contribs)
Removed claims
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(2 intermediate revisions by 2 users not shown)
Property / author
 
Property / author: Ehud Kalai / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / author
 
Property / author: Dov Samet / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / author
 
Property / author: William G. Stanford / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / reviewed by
 
Property / reviewed by: Manfred Nermuth / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3853475 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 10:14, 19 June 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
A note on reactive equilibria in the discounted prisoner's dilemma and associated games
scientific article

    Statements

    A note on reactive equilibria in the discounted prisoner's dilemma and associated games (English)
    0 references
    1988
    0 references
    It is shown that the Tit-for-Tat strategy (and also more general reactive strategies) in the standard repeated prisoners' dilemma is not a perfect equilibrium, except for certain special values of the discount factors.
    0 references
    reactive equilibria
    0 references
    Tit-for-Tat strategy
    0 references
    reactive strategies
    0 references
    repeated prisoners' dilemma
    0 references
    perfect equilibrium
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references

    Identifiers