Nash implementation via hyperfunctions (Q2432512): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0088-0 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W1990286112 / rank
 
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Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
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