Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities (Q868214): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 15:00, 25 June 2024

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Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
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    Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities (English)
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    19 February 2007
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    extended strategy-proofness
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    strategy-proofness
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    indivisible goods
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    fair allocation
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    stochastic choice
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