Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity (Q2385061): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: H. J. M. Peters / rank
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Property / author: H. J. M. Peters / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2105480970 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Q4495209 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 09:53, 27 June 2024

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Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
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