The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information (Q2469850): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: Nabil I. Al-Najjar / rank
 
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Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.006 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2141845241 / rank
 
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