EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES (Q5441933): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Added link to MaRDI item.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4805737 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3997197 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Bargaining Problem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Two-Person Cooperative Games / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Two-person bargaining: An experimental test of the Nash axioms / rank
 
Normal rank

Revision as of 17:02, 27 June 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5236013
Language Label Description Also known as
English
EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5236013

    Statements

    EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    15 February 2008
    0 references
    0 references